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1. INTRODUCTION 
France, like other European countries, faces a recent and substantial increase of personal bankruptcy 
filings. The annual number of filing records increased from 188,485 in 2008 to 226,582 in 2009 
(BANQUE DE FRANCE [2008]). Several factors are thought to be responsible for this steady rise: the 
development of credit debt and revolving debt with high interest; an increase in major expenses, such 
as domestic rental and personal costs (especially following divorce or separation); and significant job 
losses. When such an adverse event occurs, some people are unable to repay the debts (which are often 
revolving debts) they have accumulated with their creditors. In this kind of financial context, it is 
necessary to understand (and test) whether personal bankruptcy law may have an impact on debtors’ 
and creditors’ incentives before the events that provoke financial distress. For instance, let’s assume 
that the prime objective of bankruptcy law is to protect creditors’ interests against debtors’: the rules 
stress that debtors must repay their debts with their future incomes and assets. This would be a means 
of reducing the risk of over-indebtedness, as it may discourage consumers from over-borrowing, with 
loans  issued  against  borrowers’  rational  anticipation  of  the  future  evolution  of  their  income. 
Alternatively, we might assume that a stronger level of creditor protection against bankruptcy filing 
might give them an incentive to offer more credit, as credit becomes more profitable. So, a solution to 
the problem of growing personal debt might be to penalize lenders who take advantage of consumers’ 
tendency to over-borrow and their ignorance of credit conditions and prices.  
The current focus of empirical studies in the area of personal bankruptcy law is mainly on (1) 
whether  the  design  of  U.S.  personal  bankruptcy  law  (especially  the  difference  in  bankruptcy 
exemptions across U.S. states) plays a role in the evolution of consumers’ bankruptcy filings; and (2)  
whether and how U.S. bankruptcy law may affect the supply of credit. 
In the first strand of research, FAY, HURST, AND WHITE [2002] explore whether, before 
filing for bankruptcy, debtors would compare their financial benefit from filing under Chapter 13 (a 
debt  reschedule  plan)  to  their  financial  benefit  from  filing  under  Chapter  7  (a  liquidation).  As 
American debtors can freely choose between these two procedures, they would a priori file for the one 
that gives them the higher financial benefit. In fact, FAY, HURST, AND WHITE give some empirical 
evidence that such strategic behavior has an impact on the number of bankruptcy filings, all else being 
equal. For instance, the more debtors’ assets are exempted from liquidation under Chapter 7, the more 
financially  distressed  debtors  are  motivated  to  file  for  such  a  bankruptcy  procedure.
1  More 
interestingly, the authors also find little support for the assumption that debtors would rather file for 
                                                 
1 More extremely, FAN AND WHITE [2003], WANG AND WHITE [2000], WHITE [1998a, 1998b, 2006] look at the risk 
of an opportunistic use of U.S. personal bankruptcy law. For instance, anticipating lenient treatment of their financial distress, 
some debtors might divert their assets prior to the bankruptcy filing in order to obtain partial debt clearance without any 
liquidation of their assets. Debtors could also accumulate credit cards by anticipating that their future financial distress would 
force creditors to accept some debt discharge. Furthermore, some borrowers might raise new, unsecured credit in order to 
reimburse  other  secured  debts  that  would  have  to  be  repaid  whatever  the  bankruptcy  process  initiated.  Finally,  some 
American debtors might choose their state of residence according its personal bankruptcy rules.   3 
bankruptcy when an adverse event occurs (i.e. the non-strategic view of bankruptcy law). This is quite 
surprising because we know that over-borrowing results mainly from an exogenous shock (such as 
loss of job, illness, or divorce—see GAN AND SABARWAL [2005]), the misuse of credit debt, or 
debtors’ inability to manage their budget (LUSARDI AND TUFANO, 2008). Further, in the time 
series, DICK AND LEHNERT [2010] shed light on the fact that evolution in bankruptcy exemptions 
is  too  small  to  explain  the  rise  in  U.S.  bankruptcy  filings.  Rather  than  the  design  of  personal 
bankruptcy law, DICK AND LEHNERT explore the extent to which consumers file in response not 
only to adverse events but also to changes in lending practices (credit card, technology to estimate 
credit risk, or commercial practices) encouraged by bank deregulation.  
The second strand of empirical research explores the links between U.S. personal bankruptcy 
and the credit market. GROPP, SCHOLZ AND WHITE [1997] demonstrate that American debtors, 
who live in states with the higher exemption levels on assets and future incomes (i.e. the most pro-
debtor states), have logically more difficulty accessing credit than others and pay a higher price for it. 
Now, if we focus only on debtors who have been quick to file for bankruptcy in the past, there are no 
clear-cut empirical results. On the one hand, MUSTO (2004), FILER AND FISHER [2005, 2007] 
provide some evidence that American debtors who file for bankruptcy suffer from credit rationing 
later. On the other hand, COHEN-COLE, DUYGAN-BUMP AND MONTORIOL-GARRIGA [2009] 
use U.S. micro-econometric data to demonstrate that the most reckless American borrowers, who 
benefited from a debt reschedule payment after their bankruptcy filing, would have quickly access to 
credit afterward.  
It is more complex to address these questions in European countries, and more particularly to 
produce  cross-country  empirical  analysis,  because  each  European  country  has  developed  its  own 
policy  toward  over-indebtedness.  One  solution  to  the  problem  of  heterogeneity  among  European 
countries might be to evaluate the specific laws for each individual country. Here, there is a risk of 
misrepresenting some laws, in particular the gap between the rules and practices of bankruptcy courts. 
For instance, when the World Bank ran cross-country comparisons in the area of corporate bankruptcy 
law,  its  legal  index  (based  on  a  set  of  four  variables)  did  not  cover  all  the legal  possibilities  of 
resolving firms’ financial distress, in particular the ways that bankruptcy courts worked. Further, to 
our knowledge, there are neither legal indicators nor specific cross-country comparisons that could 
serve to test the expected effects of personal bankruptcy law on credit markets or bankruptcy filings in 
Europe. Only JAPPELLI, PAGANO, AND DI MAGGIO [2010] try to link empirically household 
default rates to some institutional factors in a sample of European countries (by using World Bank 
indicators  on  the  extent  of  credit  information  sharing  between  lenders,  and  judicial  efficiency). 
WHITE [2007] initiates a more precise comparison between the U.S., Canada, England, France, and 
Germany.  Her  work  relies  on  seven  variables:  the  amount  of  debt  discharged,  the  level  of  asset 
exemption, the level of income exemption, the fraction of income above the exemption that debtors 
must  use  to  repay  their  debts,  the  length  of  the  repayment  obligation,  bankruptcy  costs,  and  the   4 
bankruptcy punishment (for example, debtors’ inscription on default records that could limit their 
future access to credit).
2 According to these variables, a personal bankruptcy law is said to favor 
creditors if (1) the amount of debt discharged is lower, (2) the exemption levels on debtors’ future 
incomes (or assets) are lower, (3) debtors’ penalties are higher, (4) the length of the repayment period 
is shorter, or (5) fewer assets are exempted from liquidation or debt collection.  
Following WHITE [2007], in comparison to the U.S., Canada, U.K., and Germany, French 
bankruptcy procedure seems to be the most pro-creditor in this set of countries. Indeed, the average 
duration  of  repayment  plans  is  quite  long,  approximately  eight  years  (BANQUE  DE  FRANCE 
[2008]). The levels of exemption on assets/future incomes are very low. This means that bankrupts 
will have to adjust their net income to a minimal poverty-level standard of living during the debt 
reschedule plan. Moreover, before filing for bankruptcy, individuals will have to sell their assets (if 
they  have  any)  if  they  want  to  benefit  from  a  bankruptcy  procedure.  However,  this  approach  to 
personal bankruptcy law is severely limited. For instance, French judges can impose some delays in 
payment or reduction in interest charges on creditors (the latter possibility is not included in the index 
indicated above). This applies when financial creditors have made loans to debtors who were already 
over-indebted, or when they did not sufficiently verify that debtors were able to reimburse their loan. 
Further, as WHITE [2007] noted, some bankrupts may file for a liquidation procedure, or “procédure 
de  rétablissement  personnel” (PRP),  in  order to  obtain  a full  debt  discharge in  exchange  for  the 
liquidation of their non-exempt assets (similar to the U.S. liquidation process). Here, the crucial point 
is what determines judges’ decisions to discharge (or not) personal debts, that is, judges’ practices. So, 
our paper may also be linked to the behavioral law and economics literature, through our common 
focus  on  how  judges  apply  the  law.  In  the  area  of  personal  bankruptcy  law,  RACHLINSKI, 
GUTHRIE,  AND  WIRSTRICH  [2007]  explore  whether  there  is  room  for  emotional  influence  in 
judges’ decision making in the U.S. They show that debtors’ apologies (for excessive accumulation of 
debts) has little effect on judges’ choices whether or not to discharge debts, even after controlling for 
judges’ characteristics (gender, judicial experience, and political affiliation). Instead, they give some 
evidence that Republican judges are more likely than Democrat judges to make decisions in favor of 
creditors.  
An economic analysis of personal bankruptcy law reveals that there are two procedures for 
resolving financial distress. The first aims at elaborating a restructuring debt schedule plan through 
debt renegotiation between the debtor and the main creditors under the supervision of a judge or an 
administrative authority. This bankruptcy process generally orders an automatic stay on creditors’ 
pursuits in order to protect the debtors. Nevertheless, some creditors (in particular, secured creditors) 
are far from powerless when individual debtors cannot meet their debt obligations. In France, they can 
                                                 
2  We  could  add  other  characteristics.  For  example,  we  could  test  whether  or  not  consumers  choose  freely 
between the various existing bankruptcy procedures. We could also analyze the conditions under which secured 
creditors can collect their claims even after the bankruptcy filing, especially their order in the absolute priority 
rule in the case of liquidation.   5 
use specific procedures to repossess or foreclose on some assets (such as homes or cars), debit money 
from  debtors’  wages,  stop  debtors’  bank  accounts, or  impose  penalties for  late  credit  repayment. 
Failing that, if the debt renegotiation succeeds, debtors usually have to reimburse their debt (whole or 
in part) from their future income within a fixed period. Generally, the law decrees that part of future 
earnings is exempt from debt reimbursement, depending on family size, location, and so on. In some 
cases (for example, in France), a judge can also authorize delays in debt repayment when creditors do 
not  reduce  their  claims  sufficiently,  or  when  lenders  paid  insufficient  attention  to  individual 
borrowers’ ability to repay loans. The second bankruptcy procedure allows for personal debts to be 
discharged under the supervision of a judge. This alternative procedure is intended to discharge debts 
and liquidate debtors’ non-exempt assets—in other words, it requires bankrupts to repay from the 
proceeds of liquidation. However, for bankrupts to benefit from this fresh start, a judge has first to 
gauge whether or not they have a chance of repaying their debts in the future. If they do, the judge 
may order a new schedule of repayment of creditors, or ask for debtors and creditors to renegotiate a 
debt reschedule plan.  
As WHITE [2007] noted, it is generally agreed that France is clearly pro-creditor, in the sense 
that  bankruptcy  laws  tends  to  protect  creditors’  interests  rather  than  debtors’.  Although  France 
introduced the possibility of discharging debts in exchange for liquidation of non-exempt assets in 
2003, it is debatable whether this modification really does work in favor of borrowers, because debt 
discharge ultimately depends a judge’s ruling on a case. In this paper we explore how French judges 
decide whether or not debts are discharged and non-exempt assets are liquidated through PRP. To do 
so, we examine how this move toward a more pro-debtor bankruptcy system is implemented and 
whether  it  constitutes  a  means  of  promoting  a  fresh  start  for  bankrupts.  We  argue  that  French 
bankruptcy  judges  face  a  particular  dilemma,  having  implicitly  to  arbitrate  between  the  right  of 
creditors to recover their claims and the right of debtors to ask to benefit from a release from debt. 
Based on an empirical study of 1069 French bankruptcy filings in the period 2004–5, we report three 
observable results. First, we describe how judges allow debt discharge according to the legal criteria of 
bona fide (“bonne foi”) and over-indebtedness (“situation irrémédiablement compromise”). Second, 
we find evidence that judges not only discharge debts for the most financially distressed, but they also 
block debt release for debtors who have over-borrowed or failed to balance their budget. Third, we 
also consider, from the perspective of behavioral law and economics, how bankruptcy judges are 
influenced by labor market conditions. More precisely, we report evidence that judges’ decisions are 
significantly influenced by the level of unemployment rate in their locality. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we report the basic features of 
French bankruptcy law; section 3 presents our data and regression results; section 4 concludes.   6 
2. FRENCH PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY LAW: AN OVERVIEW 
Before benefiting (or otherwise) from a debt discharge, financially distressed debtors generally have to 
file for bankruptcy before an administrative authority, the “commission de surendettement” (CSUR). 
This initial bankruptcy filing is automatically associated with the debtor’s record in a national file of 
debtors  who  fail  to  reimburse  their  debts.  The  CSUR  will  either  accept  or  reject  the  debtor’s 
bankruptcy filing: more precisely, the CSUR authorizes debtors to continue the bankruptcy process 
only  if  they  appear  (1)  to  have  significant  difficulties  in  repaying  their  debts  from  their  current 
incomes and assets; and (2) are bona fide. All creditors’ pursuits (for example, assets seizing) are put 
on hold during this bargaining process. After examining the debtor’s situation (i.e., debts, resources, 
charges,  and  the  structure  of  claims),  the  CSUR  (rather  than the  debtor)  has  the  right  to  choose 
between two different bankruptcy procedures, the “plan de redressement” and the PRP. However, 
debtors can stop both these procedures whenever they have financial incentive to do so.  
The “plan de redressement.” This procedure aims at elaborating a restructuring debt schedule 
through debt renegotiation with debtors and their main creditors. The crucial point is that the CSUR 
calculates a standard level of charges for each debtor, based on a scale that takes into account family 
size, living expenses, medical and school bills. Debts will be reimbursed from the difference between 
the debtor’s resources or assets and this standard level of charges over a fixed period. When this 
renegotiation fails, a judge may enforce a debt restructuring schedule by ruling that debtors do not 
have to reimburse their debts for a maximum of two years. The judge can also partly reduce the debts 
or elaborate a schedule of repayment for creditors (on condition that debts will be totally reimbursed 
during a period of ten years at most).  
The  “procedure  de  rétablissement  personnel”  (PRP).  When,  in  a  first  step,  the  CSUR 
estimates that there is no (or very little) chance of debts being reimbursed from future income and 
assets, a judge (with the debtor’s authorization) has to decide in a second step whether debts (except 
for specific debts such as secured loans, fines, or child support fees) will be discharged or not. In 
exchange, all the debtor’s non-exempt
3 assets are liquidated, and the liquidation proceeds are divided 
among creditors according to a strict priority rule. However, liquidation values are generally very low 
because debtors who have non-exempt assets will oppose this procedure whenever the value of debt 
discharged is less than the value of those assets (plus some direct and indirect bankruptcy costs). To 
order a debt to be discharged, judges have to verify that debtors are unable to repay their debts with 
their future income and assets, and are bona fide. The first of these criteria means that the debtor’s 
capacity to reimburse the debts should be negatively and significantly related to the probability of a 
discharge  of  debt  in  the  PRP.  The  second  excludes  debtors  who  use  the  bankruptcy  procedure 
strategically to discharge their debts when they have accumulated too many debts in the past.  
                                                 
3 Exempt assets are mainly vehicles and other goods essential to life.   7 
3. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In this section, we test how judges handle the discharge of debts in exchange for the liquidation of 
non-exempt assets within the PRP, beginning with our data on PRP. 
 
3.1. DATA DESCRIPTION 
Our research project studied the practices of courts ruling on personal bankruptcy law. Even though 
this  subject  is  attractive,  due  to  the  steady  rise  of  over-indebtedness  in  European  countries,  only 
limited information is available on the subject of the legal treatment of financial distress. In order to 
improve the quality of the work delivered by the courts, or at least to understand judicial practices 
better, the French Ministry of Justice ordered a large data collection on PRP for the period 2004–5. 
Information  was  gathered  manually  from  documents  in  158  French  courts,  including  bankruptcy 
declarations, court decisions and motivations, lists of claims, and characteristics of bankrupts. Using 
this information, we obtained a database of 4098 judgments delivered in the period 2004–5 in 20 
regions (out of a global set of 22 regions), representing nearly 11% of the entire population of debtors 
filing for a PRP during this period. For each bankruptcy case, we gathered data about the debtor’s 
financial situation at the triggering time: total amount of claims due; total income (including wages, 
unemployment benefit, family income support, housing benefit, rent allowance, sickness benefit, and 
old-age  pension);  total  amount  of  expenses  (debt  service,  dependents,  tax,  rent,  plus  additional 
expenses calculated by the judge on the basis of family size); asset list (exempt or not); and the total 
number  of  claims.  We  regrouped  creditors  in  two  sets:  financial  claimants  (banks  and  firms 
specializing in consumer credit), and other (rent, taxes, energy or communication bills, private debts, 
commercial debts, unpaid alimony, tuition fees, fines). We controlled our results according to length 
of procedure (i.e., the time between the date of PRP filing and the date of judgment) as judicial delay 
can be considered a proxy for court congestion. After controlling for lack of responses on some of the 
variables described here, the sample size falls into 1120 observations on a set of 20 French regions.  
 In this paper, we focus only on bona fide debtors, excluding from the sample 36 debtors who 
were  judged  mala  fide  for  the  following  reasons:  falsification  of  information,  voluntary  over-
indebtedness in order to file for bankruptcy, and checks without funds. As a consequence, we analyzed 
data only for individuals who do not voluntarily become bankrupts in order to benefit from full debt 
discharge  by  a  judge  (or,  at  least  those  who  have  not  been  identified  by  the  judge).  Finally,  in 
designing our analysis, we only retained data for individuals who reported no real estate assets at the 
triggering time. Of our sample of 1105 debtors, 15 are owners (occupier or not). So, a very large 
majority of bankrupts have no assets to liquidate in order to benefit from debt release in exchange. 
Overall, this figure indicates either that debtors with some real estate assets refuse to file for this 
bankruptcy procedure, or that such debtors have restricted access to this procedure, meaning that some 
CSUR impose a debt reschedule plan on these debtors. However, this does not mean that individuals 
have no assets at all. Of the 1069 individuals, 917 clearly have no assets but 152 own a car and/or   8 
furniture. More precisely, 106 bankrupts own a car and no furniture, 11 bankrupts own both a car and 
furniture, and 35 bankrupts own furniture but no car. However, these assets (cars and furniture) are 
generally exempt from liquidation because people need cars to get to work, and furniture has a very 
low liquidation value. As a consequence, we do not take account of debtors’ assets in our analysis 
because debtors are either exempted or have none.
4  
 
Table 1 – Variable means and standard deviations for the bankruptcy sample  
according to the judgment (debt discharge or not) 
Statistics on the sample  (N=1069)
Variables mean stand.dev. Variables mean stand.dev.
Total debts (euros) 20775.07 37086.46 Nb. creditors 7.63 4.78
Resources (euros) 904.16 361.39 Nb. financial creditors 2.69 2.16
Current expenses (euros) 1006.58 358.16 Nb. ordinary creditors 4.94 4.44
Duration (days) 34.52 16.66
Total debts (euros) No debt discharge Debt discharge
Analysis of judgment:  mean 21873.74 20401.97
Debt discharge  (N=798) t 0.6700
versus  no debt discharge  (N=271) p value 0.5030
stand. dev. 27758.80 39767.93
F 0.4872
p value <.0001
Resources (euros) No debt discharge Debt discharge Current expenses (euros) No debt discharge Debt discharge
mean 1033.69 860.17 mean 1003.81 1007.52
t 6.2001 t  -0.1365
p value <.0001 p value 0.8914
stand. dev. 419.06 328.46 stand. dev. 400.00 343.06
F 1.6277 F 1.3595
p value <.0001 p value 0.00075
Nb. creditors No debt discharge Debt discharge Duration (days) No debt discharge Debt discharge
mean 8.15 7.45 mean 37.46 33.51
t 2.0773 t 3.1251
p value 0.0380 p value 0.0019
stand. dev. 4.94 4.72 stand. dev. 18.78 15.78
F 1.0966 F 1.4161
p value 0.1713 p value 0.00016
Nb. financial creditors No debt discharge Debt discharge Nb. ordinary creditors No debt discharge Debt discharge
mean 2.9077 2.6215 mean 5.4235 4.8320
t 1.7116 t 1.3179
p value 0.0877 p value 0.1878
stand. dev. 2.4830 2.0384 stand. dev. 4.5712 4.3953
F 1.4838 F 1.0816
p value <.0001 p value 0.2093  
 
Note: in first part of Table 1, we report summary statistics on the sample. In second part, we make a distinction between the group of debtors 
that benefits from a debt discharge and the group that does not. For each group, we compute both the mean and the standard deviation for the 
following set of variables: size of the debt, resources, current expenses, number of creditors, number of financial creditors, number of 
ordinary creditors, and duration of the legal process. We also report the results of t-tests to evaluate the difference in means between the two 
groups of debtors. The equality of variances is verified with the F test. Finally, the p-level reported for both tests represents the probability of 
error involved in accepting the hypothesis about existence of a difference (in mean or variance).  
 
Table 1 shows that the mean amount of debtors’ monthly resources is €904.17, the mean 
amount of debts is €20775.07 and the mean amount of monthly expenses €1006.58. As a result, 
debtors have a mean negative capacity to reimburse their debts (here, the difference between resources 
                                                 
4 In the regression analysis we verified that there was no significant interaction between a judge’s decision to 
cancel debts and a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bankrupt has some assets (car and/or furniture) and zero if 
none. We do not report this result in this paper.     9 
and expenses). More precisely, 758 debtors have a strictly negative capacity to reimburse, and 311 
debtors have a positive one. Further, debtors are indebted to 7.63 creditors at mean, with a minimum 
of one creditor and a maximum of 35 (median value = 7). The mean number of financial (other) 
creditors is 2.69 (4.94). Finally, the mean length of the procedure is 34.52 days with a maximum 
duration of 147 days. Now, if we compare debtors whose debts are discharged by the judge to other 
bankrupts, we find that 25.35% of debtors in our sample who filed for PRP did not benefit from a debt 
discharge  (note  that  this  ratio  is  equivalent  to  33.2%  for  the  entire  population,  BANQUE  DE 
FRANCE [2008]). In Table 1, we stress several differences between the two sets of debtors. First, 
bankrupts  whose  debt  discharge  is  refused by  the judge  present the  highest values  for resources, 
number of creditors, number of financial creditors, and duration (see t test in Table 1). Second, there is 
no significant difference between the means (in terms of in debt size, current expenses and number of 
ordinary creditors) of debtors who benefit from a debt release and those who do not. We explore these 
differences in  the  following  section  and  take  a  closer look  at the  way judges  deal  with  personal 
bankruptcy.  
 
3.2. DO JUDGES “PUNISH” DEFAULT? 
Table 1 indicates that decision making in courts is largely influenced by the financial situation of 
bankrupts.  In  this  section  we  examine  the  possibility  that  judges  “punish”  debtors  for  over-
indebtedness—that is, they could penalize some debtors by denying them debt discharge if they have 
too many debts. We note also that, from an economic point of view, debt discharge may be interpreted 
as a punishment for creditors, for example, because they offered too many credit.  
To  study  these  effects,  we  first  control  for  the  debtor’s  capacity  to  reimburse  debt  from 
(future) income, computing the ratio Reimbursment capacity in the following way. First, for each 
debtor we calculate the difference between annual resources and annual expenses, divided by the total 
amount  of  debts.  Second,  we  multiply  each  of  these  values  by  the  median  duration  of  the  debt 
reschedule  plans  elaborated  by  the  CSURs  (approximately  five  years,  BANQUE  DE  FRANCE 
[2008]).  Recall  that  when  judges  decline  debt  discharge,  debtors  generally  benefit  from  a 
reorganization plan under the supervision of a CSUR. Notice also that calculated values are either 
positive or negative because, for some debtors, expenses are higher than resources. Third, for each 
debtor we keep the maximum value between zero and the value calculated above. As explanatory 
variables, we use the structure of claims (number of creditors, number of financial creditors, and 
number of ordinary creditors) to explore first whether a larger number of claims may significantly 
influence the bankruptcy court’s decision and, second, to what extent judges might consider the case 
of debtors who seem to have over-borrowed in terms of the number (rather than the amounts) of their 
claims. We showed in Table 1 that there is no significant difference between the mean amount of debt 
of debtors who benefit from a debt release and those who do not.    10 
In order to monitor judicial practice, we run a Logit regression analysis where the dependent 
variable equals 1 if the judge discharges all the debt and zero otherwise. In a first set of models, shown 
in Table 2, we control the judgment with the debtor’s reimbursement capacity, the duration of the legal 
procedure, and some indications about debt structure. More precisely, we run two models. Model 1 
includes reimbursement capacity, the log of duration of the procedure and the log of the number of 
creditors. Model 2 distinguishes between the log of financial creditors and the log of ordinary creditors 
(see our earlier definition of these groups). In Table 3, we report a second set of regressions in which 
we  analyze  the  robustness  of  our  results,  repeating  our  analysis  after  introducing  the  variable 
Ind(Unemployed),  which  equals  1  when  the  debtor  is  unemployed  and  zero  otherwise. 
 
Table 2 – Explanation of debt discharge 
Variables
Estimation Prob. >khi2 Estimation Prob. >khi2
Constant 3.3133 *** <.0001 3.0718 *** <.0001
Reimb. Cap.  - 1.6314 *** <.0001  - 1.6347 *** <.0001
Log duration  - 0.3475 ** 0.0108  - 0.3513 ** 0.0107
Log Nb. Creditors  - 0.3411 ** 0.0150
Log Nb. Fin Creditors  - 0.2173 * 0.1000
Log Nb. Ordin. Creditors  - 0.1224 0.2072
Logit Regression Nb. debt disch: 798 Nb. debt disch: 798
Nb. debt resch: 271 Nb. debt resch: 271
% concordant: 73.4 % concordant: 73.3
Condition index: 13.85 (<30) Condition index: 14.89 (<30)
Estimation method: Test khi2 Pr > Khi2 Test khi2 Pr > Khi2
maximum likelihood Likelihood 132.96 <.0001 Likelihood 130.76 <.0001
Score 30.17 <.0001 Score 27.62 <.0001
Wald 76.42 <.0001 Wald 74.98 <.0001
no debt discharge no debt discharge
Model 1: 1069 obs. Model 2: 1069 obs.
Debt discharge vs. Debt discharge vs.
 
Note: Table 2 reports the results of Logit regression analysis of the determinants of judicial decisions to discharge debts on the decision to 
(implicitly) order the borrower to repay debts from future income and assets. We report the reimbursement capacity, which is the maximum 
between zero and the following ratio: at the numerator, we have the product between the difference (annual resources – annual expenses) and 
the median duration of the debt reschedule plans elaborated by the CSUR. The denominator equals the total amount of debts. The other 
variables are the log of the length of the judicial procedure, the log of the number of creditors, the log of the number of financial creditors, 
and the log of the number of ordinary creditors. Collinearity diagnostic: if condition index > 30 then there is strong collinearity. The sample 
is described in subsection 3.1. Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 3 – Explanation of debt discharge including debtor’s employment status 
Variables
Estimation Prob. >khi2 Estimation Prob. >khi2
Constant 3.1612 *** <.0001 2.8867 *** <.0001
Ind(Unemployed) 0.3363 ** 0.0279 0.3205 ** 0.0411
Reimb. Cap.  - 1.5721 *** <.0001  - 1.782 *** <.0001
Log duration  - 0.3561 *** 0.0091  - 0.3594 *** 0.0084
Log Nb. Creditors  - 0.3462 ** 0.0138
Log Nb. Fin Creditors  - 0.1646 0.2279
Log Nb. Ordin. Creditors  - 0.1434 0.1424
Logit Regression Nb. debt disch: 798 Nb. debt disch: 798
Nb. debt resch: 271 Nb. debt resch: 271
% concordant: 72.8 % concordant: 72.7
Condition index: 15.09 (<30) Condition index: 16.55 (<30)
Estimation method: Test khi2 Pr > Khi2 Test khi2 Pr > Khi2
maximum likelihood Likelihood 137.78 <.0001 Likelihood 134.92 <.0001
Score 41.62 <.0001 Score 38.92 <.0001
Wald 81.99 <.0001 Wald 79.67 <.0001
Debt discharge vs. Debt discharge vs.
no debt discharge no debt discharge
Model 3: 1069 obs. Model 4: 1069 obs.
 
 
Note: In comparison to the regressions depicted in Table 2, we add Ind(Unemployment), a dummy variable that equals 1 if the debtor is 
unemployed and zero if not (i.e., employed or retired). All other explanatory variables are the same as in Table 2. Collinearity diagnostic: if 
condition index > 30 then there is strong collinearity. The sample is described in subsection 3.1. Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Obviously, reimbursement capacity is the most important and significant factor to explain the 
probability of debt discharge. It suggests that those debtors who are least able to repay their debts (or 
those who are more financially distressed) have a greater probability of benefiting from a fresh start. In 
addition, we have controlled for the amount of resources, expenses, and debt separately but did not 
include these variables in the same regression model because of the high degree of correlation between 
resources and expenses. In this way, we did not find any significant relation between the likelihood of 
debt discharge and the total amount claimed whatever the set of regressions (regression results are not 
reported in the paper—note that this result appears in Table 1). Our explanation is as follows. Before 
filing for this bankruptcy procedure, debtors would have attempted to renegotiate their debts privately, 
or under the supervision of a CSUR, and have failed. So, these debtors are significantly financially 
distressed,  meaning  that  the  outstanding  amount  owed  does  not  constitute  a  way  for  judges  to 
discriminate between them.  
The main finding in Tables 2 and 3 is that the coefficient of the log of number of creditors is 
negative and statistically significant. This means that having a large number of creditors reveals more 
than  the  debtors’  level  of  financial  distress. Judges  might  consider  that  having  multiple creditors 
indicates that debtors have failed to balance their budget, or over-borrowed. In Model 2 we show that 
it is the number of financial creditors, rather than the number of ordinary creditors (controlling with 
the reimbursement capacity and the log of duration of the procedure), that tends to disqualify debtors 
from debt discharge. This result gives some insight into the intuition that it is the number of financial 
debts (mainly debt consumption or credit cards) that may motivate bankruptcy courts to refuse debt   12 
discharge due to over-borrowing.
5 In other words, our data illuminate the extent to which specialized 
judges are influenced by their sense that debtors are responsible for their financial situation.   
In addition, we show in Table 3 that this last result is not robust to the inclusion of a dummy 
variable—  Ind(Unemployed)—indicating  whether  or  not  the  debtor  is  unemployed.  In  Model  4 
adjusted for the variables Ind(Unemployed), Reimbursement capacity, Log duration, Log number of 
financial creditors, and Log number of ordinary creditors, it appears that the log of financial creditors 
is not yet significantly associated with the likelihood of debt discharge. We also note in Model 3 that 
the number of creditors always plays a significant role in the judge’s decision, suggesting that a large 
number of debts may prevent some debtors from a fresh start. As a consequence, our model suggests 
that the effect of capital structure is not so trivial. Unemployed debtors are more likely to benefit from 
debt  clearing  than  employed  debtors,  controlling  with  debt  structure.  This  result  undermines  the 
intuition that the number of financial debts (mainly debt consumption or credit cards) may motivate 
bankruptcy courts to refuse debt discharge. More simply, it is less clear how the difference between 
financial and ordinary debts affects the judge’s decision. However, this last finding is more in line 
with the objective to offer financially distressed debtors a fresh start.  
Finally, Table 3 contains another interesting result that has to be interpreted with care. It 
appears that the log of the duration of the procedure plays a role in the court’s decision making. Here, 
we  consider that the duration  of the  legal  procedure  is  closely  correlated  with  the  overwhelming 
number of personal bankruptcy filings with which the courts have to deal. In effect, we are testing 
whether debtors can throw themselves on the mercy of the judge if their case takes a long time. As a 
consequence, we do not consider any strategic behavior by lenders or borrowers within the procedure, 
such as voluntary delays in furnishing information or documents, or claimants’ requests to set out the 
judge’s decision. Table 3 shows clearly that the longer the length of the procedure, the smaller the 
likelihood of debt discharge. So, contrary to the hypothesis described above, debtors do not benefit 
from judges’ leniency when judicial delays increase due to the rise in personal bankruptcy filings.  
 
3.3. JUDGES’ DECISIONS AND MACROECONOMIC/SOCIAL CONTEXT 
To complete our analysis, we explore whether judges’ decisions to discharge debts are influenced by 
the external environment of the bankruptcy case. More precisely, we test a judge’s sensibility to the 
unemployment  rate in  the  court’s  locality.  To  do  this,  we  first  report  the  difference  between  the 
unemployment  rate  in  the  court’s  locality  (one  of  20  French  regions)  and  the  mean  national 
unemployment rate (the variable (Unemployment rate – Av)). Second, we construct a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the unemployment rate in the court’s locality is superior to the mean unemployment 
rate (the variable Ind(Unemployment rate > Av)). This variable allows us to test whether there is a 
                                                 
5  We  have  also  included  the  number  of  creditors  squared  as  regressors  in  our  models  in  order  to  test  for 
nonlinearities in the effect of the structure of claims on the judgment (results are not reported in this paper). We 
found a U-shaped relation between the probability of debt discharge and the number of creditors.    13 
judicial bias in favour of bankrupts when unemployment is relatively high. Table 4 shows this new set 
of regressions. 
Table 4 – Explanation of debt discharge related to external environment 
Variables
Estimation Prob. >khi2 Estimation Prob. >khi2
Constant  2.9530*** <.0001  2.7658*** <.0001
Ind(Unemployed) 0.3587** 0.0203  0.3368** 0.0295
Reimb. Capacity  - 1.5417*** <.0001  -1.6002*** <.0001
Log duration  - 0.2799** 0.0381  -0.3021** 0.0245
Log Nb. Creditors  - 0.3284** 0.0198  -0.3599** 0.0107
(Unemp. Rate - Av) 29.6725*** <.0001
Ind(Unemp. Rate > Av)  0.8388*** <.0001
Logit Regression Nb. debt disch: 798 Nb. debt disch: 798
Nb. debt resch: 271 Nb. debt resch: 271
% concordant: 75.8 % concordant: 75.2
Condition index: 15.32 (<30) Condition index: 16.10 (<30)
Estimation method: Test khi2 Pr > Khi2 Test khi2 Pr > Khi2
maximum likelihood Likelihood 155.93 <.0001 Likelihood 161.35 <.0001
Score 59.08 <.0001 Score 60.88 <.0001
Wald 95.99 <.0001 Wald 96.93 <.0001
Model 5: 1069 obs. Model 6: 1069 obs.
no debt discharge no debt discharge
Debt discharge vs. Debt discharge vs.
 
Note: In comparison to regressions depicted in Table 3, we introduce in Model 5 the variable (Unemployment rate - Av). Model 6 includes 
the variable Ind(Unemployment rate > Av). See subsection 3.3 for a description of these variables. Collinearity diagnostic: if condition index 
> 30 then there is strong collinearity. The sample is described in subsection 3.1. Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
It appears in Table 4 that the macroeconomic context proxied by the unemployment rate (in 
comparison to the mean rate) plays a significant role in judicial decision making. The regression 
estimates indicate that the higher the regional unemployment rate (in comparison to the mean rate), the 
higher  the  likelihood  of  debt  discharge.  In  other  words,  judges  are  more  likely  to  enforce  debt 
discharge when there is a clear shortage of employment, or when debtors face increased risk of an 
adverse event (job loss) in the future (by controlling for the current debtor’s employment status). 
Again, we use Table 4 to confirm that judges also tend to disqualify debtors with multiple debts from 
full  debt  discharge.  Our  findings  complete  empirical  results  showing  that  economic  conditions 
influence judges’ decisions. For instance, ICHINO, POLO AND RETTORE [2003] demonstrate that 
judges acting in Italian labor courts are more likely to decide in favor of workers when and where 
unemployment  is  higher.  Further,  MARINESCU  [2008]  gives  empirical  evidence  from  British 
employment courts that judges are more pro-firm when the unemployment rate is raised. All these 
results support the idea that judges do not only enforce debt or employment contracts, but that they 
maximize either the welfare of the trial parties or social welfare. 
  
4. CONCLUSION 
Our  observations  in  the  French  legal  system  show  that  even  if  all  countries  appear  to  be  acting 
similarly in their treatment of personal bankruptcy law (reorganization versus liquidation), we need to 
run more realistic studies to assess better the work of courts in each country. Indeed, cross-country   14 
comparisons generally suffer from a gap between bankruptcy rules and judicial practice. For instance, 
a first reading of the French personal bankruptcy rules indicates that this system has been more pro-
debtor since 2003, in the sense that it allows for debt discharge (in exchange for liquidation of non-
exempt assets) under the supervision of a specialized judge. In this paper, we show that this conclusion 
may be wrong for two reasons. First, in the period 2004–5, we note that more than one-third of 
borrowers who filed for such a procedure were denied debt discharge. More surprising, all these 
debtors were previously identified as financially distressed by an administrative authority or CSUR 
(meaning that there was no chance of elaborating a rescheduled debt payment, on the assumption that 
CSUR makes no filtering errors). Second, we find in our sample that a great majority of debtors who 
filed for PRP had no assets to liquidate.  
To better assess the impact of the French bankruptcy procedure on debtors and creditors, we 
also  explore  judicial  criteria.  After  eliminating  mala  fide  debtors,  we  show  that  a  debtor’s 
reimbursement capacity is the judge’s dominant consideration in the decision to discharge debts. More 
interestingly,  we  find  that  judges  refuse  debt  discharge  when  debtors  are  indebted  to  multiple 
creditors,  especially  financial  ones.  As  a  consequence,  judges  consider  that  some  borrowers  are 
responsible for their financial distress or over-borrowing. In that case, the lower the probability of 
discharging the debt, the more creditors (financial or not) are protected from default. This could give 
financial creditors some incentive to increase access to credit with the risk of increasing the probability 
of over-borrowing when an adverse event occurs. Finally, we show that it is necessary to control our 
estimate of the probability of debt discharge with some indicators on the macroeconomic context in 
which judges view the case. In particular, we find great statistical support for the hypothesis that 
French judges are influenced by local and regional labor market conditions. 
This analysis is somewhat incomplete. There is still quite a large set of questions to address. 
To  our  knowledge,  there  is  no  cross-country  analysis  that  relates  the  various  national  personal 
bankruptcy  systems  with  specific  forms  of  bank  debt  contracts  (size  of  loan,  level  and  type  of 
collateral, interest rate, duration). As in corporate bankruptcy law, the differences in lenders’ legal 
protection across these countries should correlate with significant differences in lenders’ strategies and 
outcomes. More simply, the design of personal bankruptcy law might help us to understand lenders’ 
recovery  rates  or  the  success  of  informal  renegotiations  (preceding  a  bankruptcy  filing).  Future 
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